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A. National Reconciliation The first section of the Central American Peace Agreement (hereafter
referred to as the "Accord") provides for three "actions of national reconciliation to allow the
people to participate, with full guarantees, in authentic political processes of a democratic nature,
on the basis of justice, freedom, and democracy..." The three actions are discussed below. 1.
National Reconciliation Commission Under the Accord the signatory governments are required
to establish a National Reconciliation Commission. The purpose of the Commission is to verify
the implementation of the national reconciliation process including the establishment of all civil
and political rights specified under the Accord. Nicaragua established the Commission on August
25, 1987. Under the Accord, members of the Commission are to represent the government (Vice
President Sergio Ramirez), the Catholic Church (Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo), and opposition
parties (Mauricio Diaz, head of the Popular Social Christian Party). The Accord states that a
fourth Commission member shall be a neutral respected citizen, having no affiliation with the
governing party or previous government employment (Gustavo Parajon, head of a Nicaraguan
relief agency). Later, Cardinal Obando, an outspoken critic of the Sandinistas, was appointed head
of the Commission. The Nicaraguan government went beyond the requirements of the Accord
and created local reconciliation commissions as well, with the intention of facilitating amnesty
offers to contra fighters, and negotiating local disputes and disagreements between Sandinista
officials and militants and persons opposed to the same. By October 1987, approximately 250 local
commissions were in operation throughout the country. 2. Dialogue The Accord specifies that
signatories must "initiate dialogue with all domestic political opposition groups that have laid
down their arms and have accepted amnesty." In early October 1987, the Nicaraguan Commission
commenced meetings toward organizing dialogue with the domestic political opposition. The 11
registered political parties and the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator (CDN) were invited to name
delegates. After three weeks of contentious debate among the parties on whether dissident party
factions should be permitted to have their own representatives in the dialogue, the government and
eight opposition parties agreed to permit representation of registered parties and dissident party
factions. Seven of the eight parties suggested to President Ortega that since the three parties and
two party factions pertaining to the Coordinator coalition were already represented in the dialogue,
the Coordinator as such should not be permitted another representative of its own. President Ortega
accepted the suggestion. On November 24, 1987, 14 opposition parties and party factions delivered
a list of 17 constitutional reforms to the Commission described as necessary for democratizing the
Constitution and for compliance with the Accord. In mid-December, Commission activities were
suspended, result of the government's refusal to undertake what it described as extraordinary
procedures to reform the Constitution. Noting that the Accord did not call for constitutional
reforms, and that such reforms must originate in the National Assembly, the government refused
to consider the opposition's 17-point proposal. Since then, beginning in January 1988, President
Ortega has indicated that his government is willing to resume the dialogue. Informal negotiations
and talks on a variety of controversial matters have occurred intermittently throughout 1988
between members of opposition organizations and government officials. 3. Amnesty The Accord
mandates that "amnesty decrees shall be issued, shall establish all the provisions to guarantee
©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.

Page 1 of 5

LADB Article Id: 073912
ISSN: 1089-1560

the inviolability of life, freedom in all its forms, property, and the security of the persons to whom
such decrees apply. Simultaneously with the issue of the amnesty decrees, irregular forces in the
respective country shall release any persons they may be holding." Amnesty for contra fighters.
Nicaragua had an amnesty law on the books for years prior to signing the Accord. Changes in
amnesty procedures were implemented, however, in the interest of making it more attractive for
the contras. Whereas the original amnesty program was administered solely by the Ministry of
the Interior (MINT), the new amnesty is offered through a national network of local civilian peace
commissions designed to address specific details of the program in each community. According
to the Nicaraguan government, 1,969 former contras had disarmed and returned to civilian life
in Nicaragua between August 5 and November 5, 1987. Since then, estimates of the number of
contra fighters accepting amnesty range from 300 to 2,000. The majority since November 1987 were
apparently former members of Indian contra groups. Amnesty for "political prisoners." In early
September 1987, the government announced it was reviewing lists of "thousands" of prisoners
for eventual release. The number of "political prisoners" in Nicaraguan jails as of early 1987 was
estimated at between 3,200 and 10,000, depending on the source. According to a detailed review
by Americas Watch published in February 1987, Nicaragua harbored a miniscule number of
political prisoners in the sense used in the West. Reviewing records of the Red Cross, Amnesty
International, and its own investigations, Americas Watch estimated that apart from common
criminals, prison inmates included about 2,200 former National Guardsmen and 1,500 individuals
charged with security-related crimes (i.e., former contras and contra collaborators). Americas
Watch is an independent human rights monitoring group based in New York. On September 13,
President Ortega announced his government's decision to pardon 16 citizens of other Central
American countries imprisoned on charges of collaborating with the contras. On November 22, the
Nicaraguan government released 985 prisoners, including about 200 former Guardsmen. Then, on
January 16, 1988, President Ortega announced in San Jose, Costa Rica, that his government would
grant amnesty to all political prisoners arrested after 1981 "immediately upon achievement of an
effective cease-fire and the incorporation of armed groups into civilian life." If no cease-fire is
reached, said Ortega, Nicaragua would free the prisoners "if the United States or any other nonCentral American country decides to accept them." Two days later the president modified the
prisoner amnesty offer. He dropped the requirement of first completing cease-fire negotiations
with the contras, saying only that the government was prepared to free all prisoners accused of
collaborating with the contras as soon as any non-Central American agrees to receive them. The
Sapoa agreement of March 1988 between the Nicaraguan government and contra leaders grants
general amnesty to those tried and convicted of violating public security laws, and for members of
the National Guard for crimes committed before the 1979 revolution. A first group of 100 prisoners
was released on April 1, 1988. The Sapoa agreement stipulates that half the remaining prisoners are
to be released when contra forces enter the cease-fire zones inside Nicaragua, and the remainder
when a permanent truce is signed. To the present, Sandinista soldiers and other persons held as
prisoners by the contras (mainly, the "Nicaraguan Democratic Force-FDN) have not been released.
B. Cease-fire The Accord urged that "a cessation of hostilities be arranged in those states in the area
currently experiencing the action of irregular or insurgent groups." The Accord does not require
any government in the region to enter into direct talks with insurgent groups. Next, discussions
regarding domestic political issues (democratization) are specifically relegated to domestic unarmed
opposition groups, and insurgents who have accepted amnesty. On October 7, 1987, the Nicaraguan
government implemented a month-long unilateral cease-fire in three northern departments in
the hopes that a cessation of hostilities would provide an opportunity for contras in those areas
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to accept amnesty. The cease-fire zone was later expanded to include the eastern coastal region
south of Puerto Cabezas. Results were disappointing in terms of the number of contra deserters. On
November 6, 1987, the Nicaraguan government appointed Cardinal Obando to mediate in ceasefire talks with the contras. In the following week, President Ortega presented an 11-point ceasefire proposal to the Cardinal, who had tentatively accepted the role of mediator. The proposal was
reportedly developed with the assistance of House Speaker Jim Wright. On November 30, contra
leaders announced selected aspects of their own cease-fire plan, including a 41-day cessation of
hostilities and simultaneous talks on political issues. The contra plan stated that "simultaneously
with the initiation of the cease-fire, the Sandinista regime shall comply, in accordance with the
conditions stipulated" in the regional peace plan. Among these "conditions" specified in the
contra document were "general amnesty," lifting the state of emergency, and "democratization,"
which included press freedom, ending subsidies to government news organizations, termination
of the military draft, and the dissolution of Sandinista neighborhood defense committees. The
document also stated that contra troops "will remain in control" of more than 30,000 square miles of
Nicaragua's total 57,000 square miles. According to a map included in the proposal, the Nicaraguan
government was portrayed as controlling a narrow strip of territory along the Pacific coast. The
contra plan also proposed that both sides disband their armies to form a new, smaller national
military force. Indirect talks between the Nicaraguan government and the contras occurred on
Dec. 4 and Dec. 22 in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. No significant progress by either side
was reported. On January 16, 1988, President Ortega announced at a Central American summit
in San Jose, Costa Rica, that his government would open direct cease-fire talks with the contras
within the next few days. Two months later on March 23, top leaders on both sides signed an
interim cease-fire pact at Sapoa, Nicaragua. The Sapoa agreement provided for a 60-day truce
beginning April 1, and high-level talks for a permanent cease-fire. During the truce the two sides
were to negotiate the location of cease-fire zones and activities permissible by parties within
those zones. They later agreed to designate seven cease-fire zones covering 20% of Nicaraguan
territory in which the contras would be relocated. The two sides have not yet reached agreement
on the precise boundaries of the cease-fire zones, and contra fighters have not relocated in said
zones. Since the end of the formal truce, the Nicaraguan government has unilaterally extended
the cease-fire. The last formal direct negotiations on a permanent truce occurred in Managua in
June. Since then, most contra fighters have relocated to base camps in Honduras. The Nicaraguan
government has offered to resume negotiations with the contra leadership on several occasions. On
September 9, the contras rejected a government suggestion for a preliminary meeting in Guatemala
to plan the resumption of talks in Managua. However, the parties did meet in Guatemala City on
September 19. Results of these discussions were apparently inconclusive. Among other things,
the contra umbrella organization known as the Nicaraguan Resistance (RN) has insisted that the
site of any future meetings must be outside of Nicaragua, and that President Ortega must attend
the negotiations. The Sapoa agreement also committed the government to providing unrestricted
freedom of expression during the interim cease-fire. The agreement allowed for up to eight contra
representatives to participate in future national dialogue deliberations once Resistance fighters
had relocated to the cease-fire zones. At this stage, Resistance members would be permitted
equal participation in elections for the Central American Parliament as well as in municipal and
national elections. All those who left the country "for political or any other reasons" may return
and participate fully in the political, economic and social life of Nicaragua without any conditions
or fear of punishment." (Additional elements of the Sapoa agreement were mentioned in the subsection on "amnesty for political prisoners" above.) C. Democratization The Accord stipulates that
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the signatory governments "commit themselves to promote an authentic democratic, pluralist and
participatory process that includes the promotion of social justice; respect for human rights;...those
measures leading to the establishment or...improvement of representative and pluralist democratic
systems which would provide guarantees for the organization of political parties, effective popular
participation in the decision making process, and...to honest electoral processes and newspapers
based on the full exercise of citizens' rights." The document also requires freedom for all media
without prior censorship, and the freedoms of association, speech and movement. Lastly, the Accord
proclaims that states of emergency shall be terminated. In January 1988, the Nicaraguan government
terminated the state of emergency restricting basic civic and political rights guaranteed in the
1987 Constitution, and abolished the Anti-Somocista Tribunals. Scattered reports of government
infringement of human rights continued, although human rights monitoring groups agree that
most abuses have occurred within war zones. In October as Hurricane Joan approached, President
Ortega announced that the state of emergency would be reimposed. The emergency decree was
lifted in mid-November. Since August 1987, the Nicaraguan government has allowed the reopening
of the opposition newspaper, La Prensa, and the resumption of broadcasting by Radio Catolica,
the Roman Catholic Church's radio station. It has lifted prior censorship and permitted opposition
rallies. In July 1988, after an anti-government rally in Nandaime turned violent, the government
suspended publication of La Prensa for 15 days, and news broadcasts by Radio Catolica indefinitely.
Over 30 opposition demonstrators were arrested by the police in Nandaime on charges of public
security and order violations. Radio Catolica has since been permitted to resume broadcasts. Next,
in mid-November, 16 of the 38 detainees were released, and another nine were released on bond.
The remainder await further prosecution and possible sentencing. D. Elections The Accord calls for
"free, pluralist and honest elections." With international observers present, each country is to hold
elections for a Central American Parliament, originally proposed in the Esquipulas Declaration of
May 25, 1986, and for municipality posts, national assembly seats and the presidency. Nicaragua's
1987 Constitution provides for a presidential election prior to January 1991, and municipality and
regional elections before year-end 1988. In June 1988 the National Assembly approved a 74-article
Municipalities Law mandating direct, competitive elections of mayors and city council members by
secret ballot. It also created local general assemblies as direct links between municipal governments
and citizens. The Nicaraguan National Assembly has ratified the establishment of a Central
American Parliament. Elections for representatives to the parliament have not yet taken place,
largely because the ratification process by all Central American legislatures is not yet complete.
E. Cessation of Aid to Irregular Forces or Insurgent Movements The Accord states that requests
shall be made of regional and extra-regional governments which provide military and other types
of aid to irregular forces to cease this support "as an indispensable element for achieving a stable
and lasting peace in the region." In addition, it provides that insurgent forces will be requested to
abstain from receiving such assistance. The Accord includes an exception for aid designed to assist
members of irregular forces in becoming reintegrated into civilian life. Nicaragua has forwarded
numerous diplomatic protests to the Honduran government requesting that Tegucigalpa terminate
all forms of assistance to the contras. In 1987, the Nicaraguan government filed a suit with the
International Court of Justice. Honduras is charged with harboring contra forces on its national
territory in violation of international law. On several occasions in 1988, Managua has offered to drop
the suit against Honduras if Tegucigalpa would agree to placement of an international peacekeeping
force on its border with Nicaragua. In September 1988, the Nicaraguan government forwarded
an official protest to Costa Rican President Oscar Arias regarding the housing in his country of
contras in a facility funded by the US Agency for International Development. F. Prohibition of Use
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of National Territory to Attack Other States The signatories of the Accord agreed to prevent the
use of their respective national territories by, and to refrain from, providing military support for
groups seeking to destabilize any one of the regional governments. While there have been claims
that Nicaraguans were (are) aiding the leftist Salvadoran rebels, evidence to support the same has
been in dispute. (Basic data from Central America Update, Latin America Data Base, Latin American
Institute, University of New Mexico, 1986-1988 editions; Inforpress Centroamericana. Proceso de Paz
en Centro America. Departamento de Informacion, Inforpress Centroamericana, 1988.)

-- End --
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